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TRUSTS - SELF-DEALING PURCHASE OF SECURITIES BY CORPORATE
FIDUCIARY FROM I TS OwN BoND DEPARTMENT -The will of Henry Binder,
deceased, probated in I 909, created a testamentary trust of which the Guardian
Savings & Trust Company, later the Guardian Trust Company, was appointed
trustee. Several years later; the corporate trustee invested part of the trust fund
in various land trust certificates. In 1933 when the trust company was taken
over by the superintendent of banks, the final accounting of the Binder trust,
filed in the probate court, listed the land trust certificates as part of the trust
assets. The land trust certificates were purchased by the corporate trustee for the
trust from a syndicate of which the trustee was a member, directly from the
bond department of the trust company, and from other sources. Held, that the
purchases from the syndicate and from the trustee's own bond department were
illegal because of self-dealing. In re Binder's Estate, 137 Ohio St. 26, 27 N. E.
(2d) 939 (1940).
The fundamental duty of loyalty of a fiduciary is breached when a corporate
trustee purchases for the trust securities owned by its bond department or securities in which it has a substantial interest.1 Such a breach of fiduciary duty makes
the transaction voidable at the option of the beneficiary within a reasonable time
after he discovers the breach, 2 and the trustee is held accountable to the trust for
all profits or losses, 8 even though the transaction was reasonable and made in
good faith.¼ However, there are instances when such a transaction may be valid,

1 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 170, comment i (1935); First Nat. Bank of St.
Petersburg v. Solomon, (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) 63 F. (2d) 900; Joliet Trust & Savings
Bank v. Ingalls, 276 Ill. App. 445 (1934); Larson v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 178
Minn. 209, 224 N. W. 235, 226 N. W. 697 (1929); 16 TEX. L. REv. 285 (1938);
Scott, "The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty," 49 HARV. L. REv. 521 at 539 (1936).
2 Baxter v. Union Industrial Trust & Savings Bank, 273 Mich. 642, 263 N. W.
762 (1935); First State Bank of Pineville v. Catron, 268 Ky. 513, 105 S. W. (2d)
162 {1937).
8 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Evans, 255 App. Div. 135, 5 N. Y. S.
(2d) 406 (1938).
¼Barker v. First Nat. Bank of Birmingham, (D. C. Ala. 1937) 20 F. Supp.
18 5; United States Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Kenosha, Wisconsin v. Sullivan, (C. C. A.
7th, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 412; Bold v. Mid-City Trust & Savings Bank, 279 Ill. App.
365 (1935).
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as in the case of ratification by the beneficiary, provision in the trust agreement
permitting self-dealing and provision by statute.5 In these three instances the
transaction to be valid must be made in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care. 6 In the case of ratification, the beneficiary must approve the transaction with full knowledge of all the facts surrounding it.7 Where provision is
made in the trust indenture, the settlor may permit self-dealing by the corporate
trustee, and most courts, in the absence of statutory prohibition, uphold such
permission provided it is specific.8 Broad discretionary power in the trustee as to
the investment of trust funds, however, is not considered sufficient to permit
the corporate trustee to indulge in self-dealing.9 In the case of statutory permission, the provision must be explicit because the courts tend to interpret such
statutes strictly, not only because they are in derogation of the common law but
also because they probably feel that the beneficiaries of a trust need the protection.10 It should be noted that the few states which have legalized self-dealing
transactions by trustees have placed strict limitations upon such self-dealing in an
attempt to safeguard the beneficiaries' interest.11 The Pennsylvania statute 12
expressly prohibits trust companies and banks from purchasing with funds held
by them as fiduciaries any asset of their respective commercial departments, but
the prohibition does not apply to investments in government bonds, mortgage
participations, and to "any other c:ise otherwise specifically provided for by the
act." Under the California statute,13 the most liberal one found, a bank can
purchase securities for one department from other departments "upon receipt
of the actual value thereof, if such bonds, securities or loans are, under the proAnnotation, 112 A. L. R. 780 (1938).
In re Flint's Will, 240 App. Div. 217, 269 N. Y. S. 470 (1934); Welch v.
Welch, (Wis. 1940) 290 N. W. 758.
7 Re Long Island Loan & Trust Co., 92 App. Div. 1, 87 N. Y. S. 65 (1904);
In re Tuttle's Estate, 162 Misc. 286, 294 N. Y. S. 230 (1937); Gates v. Plainfield
Trust Co., 121 N. J. Eq. 460, 191 A. 304 (1937).
8 Re Balfe's Will, 245 App. Div. 22, 280 N. Y. S. 128 (1935); Finley v.
Exchange Trust Co., 183 Okla. 167, So P. (2d) 296 (1938). Cf. Ohio Gen. Code
(Page, 1938), § 10506-49, forbidding such power to be given to the corporate fiduciary, and therefore any clause in a trust agreement giving corporate trustee power to
buy from itself is void. This statute was passed after the Binder trust was established
and therefore had no application in the principal case.
0 Re Peck, 152 Misc. 315, 273 N. Y. S. 552 (1934); United States Nat. Bank
&Trust Co. of Kenosha, Wisconsin v. Sullivan, (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 412.
Contra, Welch v. Welch, (Wis. 1940) 290 N. W. 758.
10 In re Tuttle's Estate, 162 Misc. 286, 294 N. Y. S. 230 (1937); Larson v.
Security Bank &Trust Co., 178 Minn. 209, 224 N. W. 325, 226 N. W. 697 (1929);
Kelly v. First Minneapolis Trust Co., 178 Minn. 215,226 N. W. 696 (1929).
11 The New York statute formerly allowed bank trustees to indulge in self-dealing,
provided the cestui qui trust was notified, the records showed the whole story clearly,
and the transaction involved only a part interest in securities. N. Y. Banking Law, §
188 (7), as amended by Laws (1917), c. 385. It has now been :imended to permit no
self-dealing whatever by corporate trustees. N. Y. Laws (1937), c. 619, Banking Law
(McKinney, 1939), § mob.
12 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp, 1939), tit. 7, § 819-1111.
18
Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1937), art. 652, § 25.
5
6

347

RECENT DECISIONS

visions of this act, a legal investment for the department purchasing the same."
In recent years the development of mortgage participating investments has also
caused a new problem in regard to self-dealing. There is a conflict of authority
in respect to the legality of such investments.14 But even those courts which
uphold their legality, in the absence of statutory authorization, are not likely
to approve an investment where the original purchase by the corporation is made
in its individual capacity and there is no earmark made at the time or soon thereafter that the mortgage will be used for participating trust investments.15 The
reason for this stand is that the trustee by taking the morgage in its own name
becomes in effect the owner, and any subsequent transfer to a trust involves
self-dealing and is therefore invalid.16 But where the trustee at the time of purchase in his own name intends the investment to be for the trust and earmarks
it as such, but keeps it just long enough for the trust to accumulate sufficient
funds to pay for it, this rule does not apply because the first purchase was essentially a purchase for the trust.17 The instant case in invalidating purchases involving self-dealing takes the sound view, which is in line with the overwhelming majority of the courts.18 It is for the legislature, not the courts, to permit
such transactions, because it can protect the interests of the beneficiary by proper
safeguards.

Felicia I. Hmiel
14 In re Shaw's Estate, 122 N. J. Eq. 536, 195 A. 525 (1937); Barker v. First
Nat. Bank of Birmingham, (D. C. Ala. 193 7) 20 F. Supp. l 8 5; McKinney, "The
Legality of Participating Mortgage Certificates as Investments for Trustees," 24 YALE
L. ]. 286 (1915). Contra, In re Barton's Estate, 331 Pa. 507, l A. (2d) 292 (1938);
Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. First Unitarian Society, 293 Mass. 480, 200
N. E. 541 (1936).
The courts which uphold the mortgage participation investments feel that the
benefit gained, namely that of investment advantages for smaller trusts, overbalance the
disadvantage of encroachment upon the common-law duties of the trustee, especially
since the disadvantages are minimized by proper bookkeeping methods. The courts
holding contra, however, feel that the danger involved in encroaching upon the common-law safeguards is too great to allow the mortgage participation investments.
1
~ First Nat. Bank of Birmingham v. Basham, 238 Ala. 500, 191 So. 873 (1939);
noted, 26 VA. L. REv. 523 (1940); 38 M1cH. L. REv. 935 (1940).
111
2 ScoTT, TRusTs, § 170.14 (1939).
17 Ibid.
18
In In re McGuffey's Estate, 123 Pa. Super. 432, 187 A. 298 (1936), the court
seemed to favor self-dealing by a corporate fiduciary, but did not lay down any general
rule which has been followed by the Pennsylvania courts.
A recent decision dealing with corporate fiduciaries held that the various departments of a corporate fiduciary arc separate entities, and therefore dealings between the
various departments are not self-dealing. Breedlove v. Freudenstein, (C. C. A. 5th,
1937) 89 F. (2d) 324, noted 37 CoL. L. REv. 1405 (1937). However, the great
majority of courts support the view that a corporate fiduciary is one entity though it
may have several departments. Flack v. Hood, 204 N. C. 337, 168 S. E. 520 (1933);
Kittson v. St. Paul Trust Co., 62 Minn. 408, 65 N. W. 74 (1895). If the courts in
the future follow the example of the Breedlove case, then the law against self-dealing
as to corporate fiduciaries will be relaxed, even though as the note in 37 CoL. L. REv.,
supra, points out, calling the various departments of a trust company separate entities
does not change the situation.

